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Abstract
In 2002, Hugh Laddie lamented the “blind adherence to dogma” that had led to an apparent impasse in
philosophical and practical discussions of intellectual property (IP):
“On the one side, the developed world side, there exists a lobby of those who believe that all IPRs [intellectual
property rights] are good for business, benefit the public at large, and act as catalysts for technical progress.
They believe and argue that, if IPRs are good, more IPRs must be better.”1
But “on the other side”, he continued:
“there exists a vociferous lobby of those who believe that IPRs are likely to cripple the development of local
industry and technology, will harm the local population, and benefit none but the developed world. They
believe and argue that, if IPRs are bad, the fewer the better.”
Laddie recommended reforms designed to ensure that IPR development and enforcement would better serve
the interests of developing countries. He hoped these reforms would provide an effective response to those
who regard IPRs as “food for the rich countries and poison for the poor”.2
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Persistent patent controversies
In 2002, Hugh Laddie lamented the “blind adherence to dogma” that had led to an apparent impasse in
philosophical and practical discussions of intellectual property (IP):
“On the one side, the developed world side, there exists a lobby of those who believe that all IPRs
[intellectual property rights] are good for business, benefit the public at large, and act as catalysts
for technical progress. They believe and argue that, if IPRs are good, more IPRs must be better.”1
But “on the other side”, he continued:
“there exists a vociferous lobby of those who believe that IPRs are likely to cripple the development
of local industry and technology, will harm the local population, and benefit none but the developed
world. They believe and argue that, if IPRs are bad, the fewer the better.”
Laddie recommended reforms designed to ensure that IPR development and enforcement would better
serve the interests of developing countries. He hoped these reforms would provide an effective response
to those who regard IPRs as “food for the rich countries and poison for the poor”.2
In 2015 we see the persistence of this disagreement, with critics urging that the international IPR regime,
including especially the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs),
creates an un-level playing field for international commerce, tilting the advantage strongly towards the
interests of the developed world and against the interests of developing nations. Similar concerns have
been raised with respect to the IP chapter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, which includes and
reinforces many of the same provisions people have found objectionable in TRIPs. Aaron James has
recently argued that the only appropriate remedy is to “eviscerate TRIPs”. He urges that we need to weaken
IPRs in order to reduce the level of unfair competition faced by developing nations.3 At the same time,
articulate advocates argue that IPRs are a crucial incentive for research and technological development,
which is otherwise woefully undersupplied by the market. In order to enhance this incentive, Alex
Rosenberg argues that we should treat “the ownership of intellectual property as a right … which is
untrumpable by any other sort of consideration from human welfare”.4 According to Rosenberg, the value
* I would like to thank Daniel Pilchman and Peter Yu for tremendously helpful comments and discussion of this project.
1Hugh Laddie, “Foreword” in Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy: Report
of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (London, 2002), p.iii.
2Laddie, “Foreword” in Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy (2002), p.iv.
3Aaron James, Fairness in Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.285. See also Ali M. Nizamuddin, The Patenting of Life, Limiting
Liberty, and the Corporate Pursuit of Seeds (New York: Lexington Books, 2015).
4Alex Rosenberg, “Designing a Successor to the Patent as Second Best Solution to the Problem of Optimal Provision of Good Ideas” in Annabelle
Lever (ed.), New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Alex Rosenberg, “The Priority
of Intellectual Property Rights” (2004) 3 Pol., Phil. & Econ. 77.
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created by IP incentives should be expected to swamp the incidental disvalues associated with the
enforcement of IPRs. Rosenberg might be read as advising that IPRs should be as strong as possible.
In this brief article, I cannot address all of the arguments that have been aired, nor put the controversies
to rest. What I will do is to examine some of the more prevalent philosophical and legal arguments on
both sides and urge a partial solution. I will give most of my attention to patents, but the argument developed
here should apply to other forms of IP as well.
The case for patents: From simple economic logic to robust (natural?) moral rights
The simple argument
The economics of patent law, in the simplest case, are straightforward: In the absence of effective IPRs,
market forces provide systematic sub-optimal incentives for creative work, including inadequate incentive
to pursue the research necessary for the development of new technologies. There are several reasons for
this: new technologies benefit future generations, whose interests are not fully represented in contemporary
market incentives. As Alex Rosenberg points out, “discovering and testing good ideas is costly and risky”.5
It may sometimes take 10–15 years and millions of dollars from the time researchers begin to develop a
new drug, or a new agricultural crop, before it is ready to market.6 On the other hand, for many products,
including software and non-hybrid crop varieties, the cost of reproduction after a new item has come on
the market, is very low. In the absence of patent protection, much research and development simply would
not take place. The likelihood that welfare-enhancing research will take place is less when research costs
are high and where the private benefits to the researcher are insecure. The patent system provides patent
holders with a temporary right to prevent other people from marketing new innovations. Possession of
this right protects and incentivises the process of research and development, leading to the creation of
new technologies that would not have existed at all if the patent incentive had not been available. Call
this the simple argument for patent protection.
So understood, do patents make people worse off—impose a welfare cost—because they prevent people
from accessing needed innovation? According to the simple argument, the answer is no, because the
technologies in question would not have existed but for the incentive created by IPRs. While patents
temporarily restrict their access to new technologies, including life-saving medicines, the people whose
access is restricted and who need these drugs would not have access to them in the absence of patent
protection. No one else would have access either. Without patents, the research would not have been
pursued. Without the research, the products would not have been created.
When patents work this way, the implementation of a patent system is a Pareto improvement: it provides
advantages for some and disadvantages for no one. This is the understanding of patent law according to
which patents add “the fuel of interest to the fire of genius, in the discovery and production of new and
useful things”, as Abraham Lincoln enthusiastically argued.7 So on this model, patents and other IPRs
enhance welfare directly. Where IPRs are welfare-enhancing and disadvantageous to no one, there are
good moral reasons to put them in place.
This instrumental case for patents, as a needed extra incentive, may gain strength at times and in
circumstances where we have an especially pressing need for innovation. There is wide agreement that
we need alternative environmentally appropriate sources of energy. Climate change may significantly
alter the circumstances of agriculture andmay increase incidence of certain diseases. Farmers in Bangladesh,
5Rosenberg, “Designing a Successor to the Patent as Second Best Solution to the Problem of Optimal Provision of Good Ideas” in Lever (ed.), New
Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property (2014), p.89.
6Edmund J. Sease and Robert A. Hodgson, “Plants are Properly Patentable under Prevailing U.S. Law and This Is Good Public Policy” (2006) 11
Drake J. Agric. L. 327.
7Abraham Lincoln, “Second Lecture on Discoveries and Inventions” in Jacksonville, Illinois, February 11, 1859.
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facing increasing floods and salt-water intrusion in agricultural areas, have a pressing need for flood-tolerant
and salt-tolerant crops, some of which are already under development. In other areas, sub-Saharan Africa
in particular, there is a similarly urgent and growing need for drought-tolerant food crops. Resource
depletion makes it less and less likely that future generations will be able to rely on the same technologies
that have been used in the past and that have supported our current standard of living.8 If we hope to leave
later generations with productive opportunities similar to those of the present generation—or, in the words
of John Rawls, to leave to future generations “a social world that makes possible a worthwhile life for all
its citizens”—then we will need to replace existing technologies with new ones and to find substitutes for
the resources we have plundered.9 For these reasons, our obligations to future generations give us a
secondary obligation to promote needed innovations. Patent and other IP protections may be at least one
way we could fulfil that obligation.
Jefferson on the simple argument
The “simple argument for patents” was accepted, more or less as stated above, by Thomas Jefferson, who
famously argued that there is no natural right to IP:
“It has been pretended … that inventors have a natural and exclusive right to their inventions. … If
nature has made any one thing less susceptible than others of exclusive property, it is the action of
the thinking power called an idea. Its peculiar character… is that no one possesses less because every
other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea fromme, receives instruction himself without
lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine receives light without darkening me.”10
According to Jefferson, following Locke in this respect, property rights in land and real property were
natural rights. The purpose of government is to secure these rights, so any government that fails to protect
and respect them thereby wrongs its citizens. But not so with IP: Jefferson argues that IP is naturally free
and available to everyone, since one person’s use of it does not block use by others. So in Jefferson’s
view, the reason for protecting IPRs is that it is advantageous. But no one is wronged if IPR protection is
not put in place:
“Society may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from [creative inventions] as an
encouragement to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or may not be done, according
to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or complaint from anybody.”11
IPRs as natural moral rights?
But is Jefferson’s view acceptable? A contrary view would hold that inventors have a special claim over
their own creations, one that is different from the claims others may have. This thought may derive in part
from the work of John Locke. Locke accepted a doctrine of “Maker’s Right”, according to which “Makers”,
those who create something new, have special claims over their creations.12 While Locke does not clearly
extend this doctrine to the case of IP, such an extension seems natural since intellectual creations come
from us in a more direct way than physical objects on which we may labour. The Maker’s Right argument
8 I do not mean to imply that all members of the present generation enjoy a reasonable standard of living.
9 John Rawls argues that we have an obligation to leave future generations with “a social world that makes possible a worthwhile life for all its
citizens”. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p.107. Bryan Barry argues that the present generation has
an obligation to leave future generations with undiminished productive opportunities. Bryan Barry,Democracy, Power, and Justice (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989), p.517.
10Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, August 13, 1813.
11Letter from Jefferson to McPherson, 1813. See also Adam Moore, Intellectual Property and Information Control (New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers, 2006), Ch.3; Seana Shiffrin, “Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property” in Stephen R. Munzer (ed.), New Essays in the Legal
and Political Theory of Property (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
12Gopal Sreenivasan, Limits of Lockean Rights in Property (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.66–74.
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appears to be stronger where it is more plausible to regard the Maker as fully responsible for the existence
of the creative product. In Locke’s view, this doctrine is arguably more fundamental than the standard
argument from “labour mixing”. Making is a form of labour. According to Locke, labour—more properly,
labour-mixing—is the operation by which people legitimately appropriate land or other goods from the
common, at least where they leave “enough and as good” for others and avoid appropriating more than
we can use before it spoils. The reason, Locke urges, is that it “hath by this labor something annexed to
it that excludes the common right of other men”.13 It is a small stretch to think that intellectual creations
are similarly associated with those responsible for their creation—and that they have “something annexed”
to them that distinguishes the claim of creators from the competing claims of non-creator users.14
Does this unique relationship between intellectual creations and their maker-creators justify a claim
that “excludes the common right of other men?” The plant breeder Luther Burbank seems initially to have
agreed with Jefferson that it does not. Early in his career, he expressed satisfaction about the fact that
patent and other IP protections were not available for work in plant science:
“No patents can be obtained on any improvements of plants, and I for one am glad that is so. The
reward is in the joy of having done good work, and the impotent envy and jealousy of those who
know nothing of the labor and sacrifices necessary, and who are by nature and cultivation kickers
rather than lifters.”15
Many years later, after spending his life developing new plant varieties in an economic environment
where he was often unable to make a profit to cover the costs of research and development, Burbank seems
to have found less solace in the impotent envy of the kickers. In a letter to his friend Paul Stark, Burbank
is reported to have written:
“I despair of anything being done at present to secure to the plant breeder any adequate returns for
his enormous outlays of energy and money. A man can patent a mousetrap or copyright a nasty song,
but if he gives the world a new fruit that will add millions to the value of the earth’s annual harvests
he will be fortunate if he is rewarded so much as having his name connected with the result. Though
the surface of plant experimentation has thus far been only scratched and there is so much
immeasurably important work to be done in this line, I would hesitate to advise a young man, no
matter how gifted or devoted, to adopt plant breeding as a life work until America takes some action
to protect his unquestioned right to some benefit from his achievements.”16
The argument in this letter was apparently given great weight when it was introduced by Representative
Purcell as a consideration in favour of the Plant Protection Act of 1930. Whether or not the words are
truly those of Luther Burbank,17 the argument has independent appeal: should people like Burbank not be
13 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government (1689) in Peter Laslett (ed.), Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1960), p.329.
14Seana Shiffrin offers quite a different, and much more detailed, analysis of Lockean rights to intellectual property in her excellent paper, “Lockean
Arguments for Private Intellectual Property” in Munzer (ed.), New Essays in the Legal and Political Theory of Property (2001).
15Luther Burbank, “How to Judge Horticultural Novelties”, Pacific Rural Press, September 30, 1911, p.264. See also Clark Wolf, “Plants, Patents,
Property, and Pirates: Luther Burbank v. Thomas Jefferson” (2007) 9(1) Bioethics in Brief, available at http://www.biotech.iastate.edu/publications
/bioethics_outreach/Bioethics_in_Brief/mar07.html [Accessed November 4, 2015].
16Letter from Luther Burbank to Paul Stark, quoted by Rep. Purcell reading a telegram received from the widow of Luther Burbank, H.R. Rep.
No.1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930). This letter is widely quoted, for example, in David Ronald Murray, Seeds of Concern: The Genetic Modification
of Plants (Wallingford: CABI Publishing, 2003), p.101; Mark Sagoff, “Animals as Inventions: Biotechnology and Intellectual Property Rights” in
Lakshman D. Guruswamy and Jeffrey A. McNeely (eds), The Protection of Global Biodiversity: Converging Strategies (Durham: Duke University
Press, 1998); Jack Wilson, “Patenting Organisms: Intellectual Property Law Meets Biology” in David Magnus, Arthur L. Caplan and Glenn McGee
(eds),Who Owns Life? (New York: Prometheus Books, 2002).
17 It is interesting to note, however, that Burbank’s letter turned up at an opportune moment: Burbank’s earlier words were introduced in discussion
as a reason against the Plant Protection Act of 1930. This letter may have been the key that turned the rhetorical tide in the congressional debate and
made the act’s passage possible. Representative Purcell apparently aired this quote during the House debate, but did not produce the letter itself. For
understandable reasons, Luther Burbank’s widow, Purcell’s source for the letter, might be expected to have favoured increased protection for plant
varieties. Since the only sources for this letter are partial sources, since the letter appeared at a moment when it perfectly served the political needs of
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able to gain profit from the beneficial products they develop? Even now many people regularly use and
enjoy various varieties developed by Burbank over the course of his life. Burbank sold the rights to the
Burbank Potato for $150. They are now the most widely produced potatoes in the United States.
Burbank’s letter includes an argument by analogy: If you can get IP protection for other kinds of creative
work, why exclude plants? The reason that had been given for the exclusion was that plants are
self-reproducing. They reproduce and distribute themselves. But legislation protecting plant breeders
sought to accommodate that feature, rather than use it as ground to deny protection altogether. There is
still vigorous disagreement about whether this effort was successful.
When Burbank’s letter refers to a plant breeder’s “unquestioned right to some benefit from his
achievements”, the right referenced cannot be a legal right. If the sentence makes sense, it must refer to
a moral or natural right. And if we find appealing the idea that plant breeders like Burbank, who devote
their lives and fortunes to the development of new varieties, should have a right to benefit from this
achievement, we might say that the strength of this appeal is a measure of the attractiveness of the idea
that creators do, pace Jefferson, have a natural moral claim to the things they create. This idea is embedded
in several areas of IP jurisprudence. It may have its greatest appeal for intellectual products in which the
creator has invested personal or artistic commitment, where it is sometimes identified as a personality
interest in intellectual products. If you, the reader, find this notion appealing, as many do, then you are
committed (to at least some degree) to the idea that creators have a natural moral right to control their
creations.18
Should we be uncomfortable with the language of natural rights? Such rights need not be interpreted
theologically (as Locke’s rights that are “granted by God”) or as having deep metaphysical underpinnings
(as Kant’s metaphysical doctrine of Right). We might simply understand them in terms of reasons: If we
find, after critical self-reflection, that we accept principles that imply a moral claim on the part of creators
to the objects they create—a claim that is different from the claims non-creators might make—then this
supports at least a prima facie case in favour of such a moral claim. A “moral right of creators over their
creations” might simply refer to a valid claim that creators have over their creative products, a claim that
can be distinguished from the competing claims of non-creators.19 The existence of such a valid claim will
not settle questions about its moral weight and significance, or how it will fare when it comes up against
the competing claims of others. In sum, the view that claims to intellectual creations are moral or natural,
in a sense, does not imply that the associated rights are absolute. Nor does it immediately imply that these
claims should be secured by law. Nonetheless, the idea that “creators have special claims to the objects
they create” undoubtedly accounts for part of the practical moral appeal of IP protection.
These are not, of course, the only moral arguments for patent and other IPRs, but I believe that they
are the principal ones. The weight and significance—I would say, the moral weight and significance—of
IPRs will depend on the strength of the arguments that constitute the strongest reasons for putting these
rights in place, but also on the weight and significance of other rights and interests with which IPRs
sometimes conflict. Moreover, IPRs may have different moral significance in international contexts than
they do in domestic law. This different significance will be salient if efforts to strengthen IPRs and to
harmonise international IP regulations have disparate effects on nations that are at different stages of
development.
those who introduced it and since there is (to my knowledge) no record of the original, it seems reasonable to question whether these are truly the
words of Luther Burbank. The argument contained in them, however, should in any case be evaluated independently.
18 It may be appropriate to identify moral rights that are typically regarded to be included as part of IPRs as having an association with the idea of
“makers’ right”. For an engaging discussion of the moral aspect of IPRs, see Peter K. Yu, “Moral Rights 2.0” (2014) 1 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 873. See
also Justin Hughes, “The Philosophy of Intellectual Property” (1988) 77 Geo. L.J. 287.
19The view that valid claims are rights has been articulately defended by Joel Feinberg, “In Defense of Moral Rights: Their Bare Existence (1990)”
in Freedom and Fulfillment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
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Patent critics
A spurious critique?
Those who are in the grip of the simple economic argument for patents may wonder at objections raised
by critics. If patents call into existence valuable and necessary new technologies that would not have
existed otherwise, how can we grudge patent holders their temporary monopoly? Some critics simply
seem to have missed the point. Vandana Shiva writes:
“Central to the ideology of IPRs is this fallacy … that people are creative only if they can make
profits and such profits are guaranteed through IPR protection. This negates the scientific creativity
of those not spurred by the search for profits, i.e., the majority of scientists in universities and public
research systems. It negates the creativity of traditional societies and the modern scientific community
in which free exchange of ideas is the very condition for creativity, not the anti-thesis.”20
This fallacy, argues Shiva, is the source of the “myth” that patents stimulate creativity. But no such
fallacious claim is involved in the simple argument for patents. Patent advocates need not and do not deny
that people can be and are creative in the absence of a patent incentive. But they also hold, reasonably,
that some forms of valuable research will not take place unless people have an additional incentive. When
research involves serious time and expense, those who pursue it must have a reasonable expectation that
they will be able to earn back the costs of research and development. In addition, patent advocates also
hope thatmore research will take place when people have a profit incentive in addition to the other motives
that regularly lead people to pursue creative work.
Even without patent protection, Luther Burbank worked a lifetime to develop new valuable plant
varieties. But where technological development is very expensive in time and money, it is less likely that
it will be pursued if developers cannot expect proprietary rights in their product. In the case of valuable
drugs or crops, for example, where production time may be more than a decade and may cost millions of
dollars, it is less likely that work will be undertaken in the absence of patent protection.
Orphaned drugs and crops
Pace Shiva, there is further evidence that IP protections spur innovation: Why have more research dollars
been poured into remedies for erectile dysfunction and baldness, while fewer have gone to “orphaned”
diseases like cholera and malaria? The reason is that people who have cholera and malaria are poor, so
the profit incentive does not work. You cannot make much money serving the interests of people who
cannot afford to pay. For those diseases, there are crucial reasons of compassion, justice and pure scientific
curiosity, all of which motivate dedicated researchers to look for ways to improve the lives of those who
suffer from them. But the research dollars are not there because there are few profit-making opportunities
associated with these orphaned diseases. The case is similar for orphaned crops (like manioc) and other
crop varieties that would serve the poor (like drought and flood-tolerant rice varieties). Important and
potentially life-saving work has been done on orphaned products that serve the poor. But the reason less
has been done is that investment firms reason that they will do better for their shareholders if they invest
in projects that will serve a paying customer base. As so often is the case, poor people are simply left out,
and their urgent needs go unmet while market funded research follows relatively trivial wants of wealthier
consumers. The relevant conclusion is not that patents do not spur welfare-enhancing innovation, but that
they do not effectively motivate innovations that would specifically benefit those who are most needy.
20Vandana Shiva, Protect or Plunder? Understanding Intellectual Property Rights (New York: Zed Books, 2001), p.25.
Patent Fairness and International Justice 67
(2015) 7 W.I.P.O.J., Issue 1 © 2015 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
Further reservations about patents: Trolls, pirates and thickets
Orphaned drugs and crops are not the only, or the most important, problem with patents, and the incentive
system they create. Critics have identified even more serious reasons why patents raise problems, in both
domestic and international contexts. In short, patents do not always work in the way the simple argument
suggests. While the simple argument implies that patents increase the rate of innovation, well-known
cases show patent holders can shut down further innovation once they possess an exclusive right.21Monopoly
holders have a motive to block competitors even when they have no intention to develop the innovation
independently.22 These are not mere hypotheticals: In one widely discussed case, Summit Technology and
VISX, both of which held key patents involved in laser eye surgery, formed a partnership to manage their
joint property in a way that gave them a de facto “veto over any attempt by the other to license technology
to third parties, effectively eliminating competition between them to offer such licenses”.23 In other cases,
patents have been used to assert exclusive private rights over intellectual resources that should properly
have been recognised as common property, available for everyone to use. In another notorious case, Larry
Proctor filed a patent for what he called the “Enola bean”, identified by colour and species. This patent
gave Proctor exclusive marketing rights for yellow beans of the species phaseolus vulgaris, which had
been in use in Mexico for hundreds of years. Proctor asserted these rights by sending cease-and-desist
orders to importers who had been bringing yellow Mayacoba beans to the United States from Mexico
since long before Proctor’s patent was issued. Proctor’s patent was widely discussed and decried and has
since been revoked. But the problem remains: the existence of the patent system gives people an incentive
to claim private rights over resources that should properly remain in the commons.24
The problems patents sometimes create are exacerbated if companies are able to extend their patents
beyond the normal period during which they can legitimately be enforced. There are several means for
“evergreening” patents—for example, by filing a new patent that covers subject matter that is, conceptually,
right next to the subject matter over which an older patent is about to expire. When patent holders manage
to extend their claims beyond the normal life of a patent, they are, in effect, asserting a private right in
subject matter that should properly move into the commons. Finally, as Tony Smith points out, patents
must be defended, and the expenditure necessary for such protection undermines the net value of the IP.
This has unfortunate economic effects, since larger companies are in a better position to manage the legal
costs associated with litigation. “[A]s a result”, writes Smith, large companies “are increasingly able to
subordinate small innovating companies in emerging sectors, choking economic dynamism.”25
There is wide agreement that patents can be misused to slow innovation, privatise common property,
choke competition and squeeze money and profitability out of otherwise dynamic companies. There is
also wide, though not universal, agreement that patents generate a profit motive that spurs innovation and
that much of the research that takes place would not have been pursued but for the promise of IP protection
at the end of the process. These two competing truths constitute the background for the debate described
by Hugh Laddie, referenced at the beginning of this article.
Perhaps the debate between critics and defenders of patent can be associated with an underlying
disagreement about the extent to which patents create technology, versus the extent to which they generate
perverse incentives and undermine innovation. Defenders tend to dismiss the problems as incidental and
21Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner cite numerous cases in Innovation and Its Discontents (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). Notably, they
discuss the case of the Wright brothers, who used their patents to obstruct further development of airplane technology.
22Tony Smith makes this point in “The End of One American Century … and the Beginning of Another?” in Richard Westra, Dennis Badeen and
Robert Albritton (eds), The Future of Capitalism after the Financial Crisis: The Varieties of Capitalism Debate in the Age of Austerity (New York:
Routledge, 2015), pp.89–90.
23Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents (2004), p.61.
24Boyle sees many contemporary changes in IP law as efforts to privatise or “enclose” what has been (and should be?) common property. James
Boyle, “The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain” (Winter/Spring 2003) 66 L. & Contemp. Probs. 33.
25 Smith, “The End of One American Century … and the Beginning of Another?” in Westra, Badeen and Albritton (eds), The Future of Capitalism
after the Financial Crisis (2015), pp.89–90.
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infrequent side effects of a system that is effective overall. Critics tend to see the problems as pervasive
and structural, as aspects of an overall system that advantages some at cost to others. Could we reduce
this disagreement to an empirical question if we had some way to measure and compare costs and benefits
of alternative IP protection regimes? This brief article cannot accomplish such a comparison. Instead, I
will examine a specific argument by critics who urge that the globalisation of patent and other IP protection
is unfair because of disparate effects on developed versus developing nations.
Fairness and international justice
There is a widespread perception that IP rules in general, and globalised IP rules in particular, are
disadvantageous to less developed countries. One face of this disadvantage is seen in the view that IP
incentives are not an effective way to provide welfare-enhancing and health-enhancing technologies that
will serve poor people. Some policy proposals seek to address this gap either by providing an additional
market incentive for research that is likely to have widespread humanitarian benefits.26 Such proposals
would not constitute a replacement for patent and other traditional IP institutions; they are rather a
supplement, designed to spur innovation in needed areas or to make innovation public as a means to
facilitate access.
IPRs and international fairness
Another face of the argument that patents are disadvantageous to countries in the global South is the
perception that patent and other IP rules are internationally unfair. The charge is that stronger IP protection
creates an advantage for developed nations, but imposes costs on developing nations. Aaron James makes
this case in a recent book on globalisation and international fairness:
“IP rules tend to slow economic development. They transfer resources from developing countries to
rich-country authors, away fromwhere they do the most good. They slow the transfer of technologies
to developing countries—one of the chief benefits of trade—by making it more expensive. They
limit the imitative innovation that was crucial for advanced countries when they industrialized, as
well as the policy flexibility that has been a hallmark of almost every development success story.”27
James is especially concerned that efforts to strengthen or harmonise international IP rules will have
these disproportionate deleterious effects on developing nations. According to James, the most important
argument in favour of strong and internationally harmonised IP protections is that such protections create
circumstances of fair competition, since otherwise innovative firms would face unfair competition from
competitors who could take advantage of their technology without ever incurring the cost of
innovation—perhaps by reverse engineering or cheaply reproducing their products. But, as he urges, this
argument from fair competition fails because international markets are already tilted in ways that
systematically advantage people in developed nations. IP harmonisation, then, is not a path to fairness,
but just another way to provide additional benefits for those who already have unfair advantages.28
26E.g. Thomas Pogge, “Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program” (2005) 36 Metaphilosophy 182; Thomas Pogge, “Intellectual
Property Rights and Access to Essential Medicines”, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDECINEQ/Resources/IntellectualPropRts.pdf
[Accessed November 4, 2015]. In association with his proposal, Pogge has initiated the Health Impact Fund (http://healthimpactfund.org/), which
seeks to implement evidenced-based rewards for innovations that are expected to bring global health gains. In a similar vein, Michael Kremer also
suggested prizes and buyouts for valuable innovations. Michael Kremer, “Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation” (1998) 113 Q.J.
Econ. 1137. See also James Love and Tim Hubbard, “The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines” (2007) 82 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1519;
J.E. Stiglitz, “Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights” (2006) 333 BritishMed. J. 1279. Pogge’s argument is sometimes wrongly taken as an argument
for the view that patents on essential medicines are inappropriate or morally impermissible. For an argument against this strong view, see Jorn
Sonderholm, “A Critique of the Argument against Patent Rights for Essential Medicines” (2014) 7 Ethics & Global Pol. 119.
27 James, Fairness in Practice (2012), pp.287–288.
28 It is worth noting that it is companies and patent holders that are in direct competition in IP markets, not nations. James recognises this in Fairness
in Practice (2012), p.299.
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Even more importantly, harmonised rules make it more difficult for nations to adjust policy so that it
can more effectively promote nationally relevant goals. Consider the predicament of Greece during the
2015 financial crisis: many commentators have urged that Greece would have been better if it had never
joined the EU currency union, but had instead kept its own domestic currency, the drachma. If Greece
had kept the drachma, it could have promoted local economic activity by reducing the value of its domestic
currency, which would be predicted to increase international investment and international purchase of
Greek products. In a similar vein, it will be sometimes advantageous for nations to develop IP rules that
serve national goals, rather than subsuming those goals under the umbrella of international harmonisation
or consistency.29 In sum, it is not at all obvious that the growing trend towards international harmonisation
of IP rules will advantage developing nations.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that there is another intertemporal issue of fairness at play: Like other
industrialised nations, the United States grew its own industrial power by flouting IP rules and using
domestic patent protection to promote the importation of technologies needed for the economic development
of a new nation. The policies undertaken by the United States in the early decades of its existence would
now be regarded by many as a form of piracy. Can it be fair for the United States and other developed
nations to deny presently developing nations from employing a strategy that the United States
enthusiastically used when it was undergoing the process of economic development?30
In the absence of strong internationally harmonised IP protections, new technologies and medicines
could be available for free, or at least without licensure costs, to people who need themmost. This spillover
value has sometimes been celebrated as a key advantage of domestic IP protections.31 Because developed
nations typically have better research infrastructure in place, most patents are held by firms and individuals
in developed nations. But for key advances in medicine, crop development and other technologies, the
people who would benefit most from access are poor people in developed nations.WilliamHaddad, writing
in the Bulletin of the World Health Organization, expresses concern that international patent harmonisation
“could have a devastating impact” on the ability of developing countries to access “essential medicines,
diagnostics, and vaccines”.32 In developing nations, the same casemight bemade for the need for sustainable
and appropriate crop varieties that can thrive in changing environmental conditions: in the worst case, IP
protections may prevent needed technologies from getting to those who need them most urgently.
Does the simple argument for patents provide a response to this objection?33 According to the simple
argument, the drugs, crops and new technologies in question would not have existed at all, but for the IP
protections that restrict access to them. This may not be the case, however, in contexts where multiple
investigators were independently working on the same project, and the protection is gained by the group
that succeeded first. More importantly, there is no reason to believe that IP protections that deny access
to poor people are optimally welfare-enhancing. As noted earlier, people without access to capital are not
the intended target for new profit-driven innovation efforts because they are not a lucrative market. The
other side of this argument is that not much loss is incurred when poor people are provided with new
technologies without licensure payments. Since poor people were not the intended market, it may be
possible to weaken IP protections in ways that serve them without undermining the incentive effect of
patent protection. This thought will be carried further in the final section of this article.
29 In this spirit, John Duffy argues in favour of diversity of patent rules. John F. Duffy, “Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law” (2002) 17
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 685.
30This point is eloquently made in Doron S. Ben-Atar, Trade Secrets: Intellectual Piracy and the Origins of American Industrial Power (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2004).
31 Sergio Lence and Dermot Hayes examine the welfare benefits of IP spillover effects in Sergio H. Lence and Dermot J. Hayes, “Welfare Impacts
of Cross-Country Spillovers in Agricultural Research” (2007) Iowa State University, Working Paper No.07-WP-446.
32William Haddad, “Rich and Poor Countries Divided on Patent Treaty” (2006) 84 Bull. World Health Org. 337.
33As I read Aaron James’s otherwise excellent discussion of intellectual property, he does not properly present the simple argument, as I have called
it here, among the arguments he considers in support of international patent harmonisation. He does consider the argument from utility (or welfare),
but his discussion is too quick and dismissive.
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IPRs as trumps?
In considering proposals to weaken IP protection, we must consider the argument of Alex Rosenberg,
who has urged that international harmonisation of IP rules is essential for effective patent protection:
“The absence of an internationally enforceable patent right is close to the same as no patent right at
all. This consequence follows from the difficulty of effective excludability in consumption of good
ideas. When the cost of copying a piece of software became only slightly more than the price of a
floppy disk, excluding non-purchasers from access to the good rests on the willingness of purchasers
or their agents to refrain from reselling or giving away a non-rivalrous good. It is well known that
no such willingness can be relied on and that consequently protection afforded by nationally
enforceable patents is quite inadequate. When the ease and undetectability of copying good ideas
dropped further, owing to the availability of high bandwidth to transmit digital copies of information,
these protections become non-existent.”34
According to Rosenberg, innovation is the most important long-term factor contributing to human welfare.
IPRs, therefore, should not be “trumpable” (or overriddable) by any non-IPR welfare considerations.
Enforcement of IPRs enacts our obligation to protect the welfare of future generations, since the long-
and medium-run welfare interests in innovation, Rosenberg argues, will swamp the short-term benefits
we might gain by temporarily overriding IPRs.
Without discussing all of the details of his argument, it is worth recognising that Rosenberg assumes,
in the ideal case, that the relationship between strong IPRs and increased innovation is a strictly increasing
function. As noted above, there are reasons to doubt this: inappropriately structured IPRs may actually
stifle innovation as they are made stronger—for example, when they can be used to quash unwanted
competition by firms that would otherwise bemore efficient producers of products and ideas. It is important,
in this context, that such anticompetitive practices can quash innovation as well as preventing market
competitors from undercutting the market price of the patented item. Strengthening IPRs will not always
increase the rate of innovation, and weakening IPRs will not always reduce the rate of innovation:
weakening the research exemption for IPRs would make IPRs stronger, but there are good reasons to
expect that a research exemption should promote, not undermine, build-on innovation. Rosenberg’s
argument also tendentiously assumes that increasing the innovation incentive will not have diminishing
marginal value as we increase the strength of IPRs. If it does have diminishing marginal value, then there
will be a point when alternative welfare-enhancing opportunities will be more efficient. The appropriate
conclusion to draw, then, is, if other parts of Rosenberg’s argument are accepted, we should maximally
protect and incentivise innovation whenever alternative welfare-enhancing opportunities are less efficient.
IPRs should then be structured to do this most effectively.
Should we accept other aspects of Rosenberg’s argument? I must confess to doubts that the value of
IPRs will always trump other welfare-enhancing ways we might spend development dollars, and even
more serious doubts that such a thing could be known or shown a priori.35 Rosenberg makes a very strong
case for the crucial importance of innovation, and the necessity of innovation if we wish to promote long-
and middle-term human welfare. Even if one were to accept a somewhat weaker version of Rosenberg’s
view, there appears to be excellent reasons to give IPRs high priority—higher than they usually
receive—when comparing their significance with other welfare-enhancing policy opportunities.
34Rosenberg, “Designing a Successor to the Patent as Second Best Solution to the Problem of Optimal Provision of Good Ideas” in Lever (ed.),
New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property (2014), pp.90–91, fn.2. See also Rosenberg, “The Priority of Intellectual Property Rights”
(2004) 3 Pol., Phil. & Econ. 77.
35 I am uncertain that this is properly an implication of Rosenberg’s argument, but a 2005 discussion of Rosenberg’s work on this topic with Julian
LaMont led me to believe so.
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Conclusion and policy implications
Stronger IPRs will not always increase the incentive for technological development. The clearest example
of this, perhaps, is the research exemption: to allow researchers to use patented subject matter for purposes
of research makes IPRs weaker than they would be if such use were prohibited. But it is unlikely that
prohibiting possession of such subject matter for purposes of research will significantly undermine the
overall incentive to pursue the development of new technologies.36 The goal should not be to maximise
the strength of IPRs, but to maximise the incentive effect of IPRs while undermining the ability of IPR
holders to use their rights to curtail others’ research or to engage in anticompetitive practices. In a similar
vein, there may be ways to adjust IPRs to promote development goals without significantly undermining
the incentive effect.
I conclude with a modest proposal, which is in the spirit of the discussion above, but which will require
more extensive discussion and defence elsewhere.37 Suppose developing nations were to adopt patent rules
that forbid enforcement of IPRs where the needed technology serves the poor. Such a rule might stipulate
that patented subject matter will be available without licensure for users whose income is less than $10,000
per year and that domestic patent infringement suits will not be recognised where the annual income of
the beneficiary—the person who benefited from the use of the protected subject matter—is less than
$10,000 per year. Such a provision should not be expected to have a serious negative impact on the
profitability of patents or to significantly diminish the incentive associated with patent protection. The
people served by such a provision are too poor to make patent holders rich. They are not the intended
target of market-driven IPR-protected innovation in any case.
Would nations that impose such a rule be subject to lawsuits by patent holders, who are concerned to
maintain the strength of their IPRs?38 Such suits could be pursued through the WTO, or perhaps within
other emerging enforcement bodies. However, there is reason to think that patent holders will not find it
advantageous to pursue such lawsuits: any company that pursued a lawsuit that expressly targeted policies
designed to serve the poor would incur significant public relations disadvantages. And perhaps developing
nations could successfully defend themselves if a suit were filed: both TRIPs and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership include provisions that allow member states to exclude from patentability subject matter that
would be contrary to “ordre public or morality”. There is a lively debate about what these provisions mean
and how they should be interpreted in court. Existing disagreement creates at least some hope that they
might be interpreted to allow developing nations to adjust domestic IP policy so that IP legislation can
more effectively serve those who most need the technologies IPRs protect.
36 I do not mean to imply that such a weakening of IPRs would not have some impact on the research incentive. There are, however, reasons to
believe that the benefit to research afforded by this exemption would outweigh the cost. The argument for that claim may not be obvious, but cannot
be made here.
37A slightly more complete defence can be found in Clark Wolf, “Getting New Agricultural Varieties to Those Who Need Them Most” (2015)
17(1) Bioethics in Brief, available at http://www.biotech.iastate.edu/march-2014-bioethics-in-brief-copy-2/ [Accessed November 4, 2015].
38 I thank Daniel Pilchman for pressing this question.
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